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1 | INTRODUC TION
This Special Issue of the Journal of Theoretical Social Psychology taps 
into one of the more interesting debates in social psychology over the 
last decade: Whether intergroup contact or collective action are strate‐
gically incompatible in fostering social change (Wright & Lubensky, 
2009). As these authors put it (p. 293), “… they may not be compatible 
at all. In fact, the underlying psychology required by these two ap‐
proaches may place them in direct conflict with each other.”
As a brief backdrop, the social psychology of collective action (e.g., 
Klandermans, 1997; for a meta‐analysis see Van Zomeren, Postmes 
& Spears, 2008) suggests that there is collective agency among in‐
dividuals to achieve social change, and that such action typically 
takes forms that are conflictual and antagonistic (e.g., social protest). 
Through collective action, it is assumed, groups make use of their 
power in numbers while trying to achieve group goals, such as social 
change. The Black Lives Matter movement is a good example of such 
a collective and conflictual push for social change, which seeks to 
enforce equal rights and treatment through collective action. The 
real problem, in this view, is structural inequality and the real solu‐
tion is to engage in intergroup conflict to enforce structural change.
Social change can also be achieved, however, by more harmoni‐
ously reducing the prejudice of those who hold it. In the context of 
Black Lives Matter, for example, one could argue that if only the prej‐
udice toward Blacks would be reduced, the group would be treated 
equally and thus the movement would be obsolete. Specifically, theory 
and research on intergroup contact has long promoted the idea that 
positive and frequent contact between different groups may lead its 
members to forego their prejudices and treat each other in more equal 
ways (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998 for a meta‐analysis, see Pettigrew 
& Tropp, 2006). Thus, the real problem, in this view, is individuals’ prej‐
udice and the solution is establishing positive and frequent contact be‐
tween members of different groups in order to harmoniously reduce it.
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Abstract
Since Wright and Lubensky (2009) suggested that intergroup contact and collective 
action seem strategically incompatible when it comes to social change, social psy‐
chologists have been inclined to see their potential match as one made in hell, rather 
than in heaven. Against this backdrop, I review and discuss the contributions to this 
Special Issue, most of which seem to suggest that intergroup contact and collective 
action are a match made in heaven, not hell. To account for these seemingly divergent 
perspectives, I suggest that both intergroup contact and collective action be concep‐
tualized as relational, interaction‐based phenomena within which the forces of har‐
mony and conflict—intergroup contact and collective action, respectively—reflect 
two sides of the same coin, namely individuals’ need to regulate their relationships 
within their social network. As such, it is individuals’ embeddedness in (networks of) 
social relationships that determines whether intergroup contact and collective action 
work together, or against each other, toward social change. I discuss the need for a 
broader and integrative theoretical perspective that does justice to the underlying 
psychology of these phenomena in terms of relationship regulation.
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The presumed incompatibility between the two seems to rely on 
a belief that the psychological forces of conflict and harmony are 
mutually exclusive—you cannot fight friends, and you cannot like 
enemies. Indeed, Wright and Lubensky (2009) argued that creating 
harmony between groups lowers the disadvantaged group’s moti‐
vation and ability to achieve actual social change (coined the irony 
of harmony; e.g., Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; see also 
Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005). Similarly, engaging in collec‐
tive action may exacerbate intergroup differences and thus fuel, 
rather than reduce, prejudice (e.g., Reynolds, Oakes, Haslam, Nolan, 
& Dolnik, 2000). As such, although both approaches may appear to 
aim for similar goals, they also seem strategically incompatible. To 
only very slightly overstate this claim from the perspective of those 
valuing social change, the match between intergroup contact and 
collective action is one made in hell.
By contrast, the key message of this article is that the match be‐
tween intergroup contact and collective action, at least when con‐
sidering the contributions to this Special Issue, actually seems to be 
one made in heaven. Indeed, a number of contributions show that 
intergroup contact facilitates collective action (e.g., Carter et al., 2019 
Hoskin, Thomas, & McGarty, 2019 Römpke, Fritsche, & Reese, 2019), 
which can, tongue‐in‐cheek of course, be considered the irony of the 
irony of harmony. Moving beyond these findings, however, I will also 
explain them by identifying the underlying psychology of both inter‐
group contact and collective action as one based in individuals’ need 
to regulate social relationships in their social networks (Fiske, 1992; 
Van Zomeren, 2016). This is most clearly visible in the operationaliza‐
tion of intergroup contact as intergroup friendships (e.g., Carter et al., 
2019; MacInnis & Hodson, 2019). Yet the very same observation has 
been made in the collective action literature, where a key predictor of 
participation in such action is: whether one has been asked to participate 
by a friend (e.g., Schussman & Soule, 2005). Yet, what seems to be 
lacking in the literature is the integration of such an emphasis on so‐
cial relationships, social interaction, and social networks. I will develop 
this argument further with an eye to what I think is a dire need for a 
broader and more integrative perspective on how intergroup contact 
and collective action promote social change.
Before doing this, however, I will first review what we can learn 
from the interesting contributions to this Special Issue when it 
comes to social change. I will then outline a relational perspective on 
intergroup contact, collective action and social change and review 
some recent findings about intergroup contact and collective action 
that support such a perspective. Finally, I close with recommenda‐
tions for the future by suggesting that we need to better understand 
when and why intergroup contact and collective action can be a 
match made in hell or heaven.
2  | THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS 
SPECIAL ISSUE
Each of the articles in this Special Issue have their own unique mes‐
sage to bring to the table, nicely fitting the call for papers on this 
topic. First, the article by MacInnis and Hodson, entitled Extending 
the benefits of intergroup contact beyond attitudes: When does in‐
tergroup contact predict greater collect action support?, reviews the 
paradox that “intergroup contact is generally associated with lower 
collective action participation and support for disadvantaged group 
members, but heightened collective action participation and support 
for advantaged group members” (p. 14). The authors discuss how 
being friends with outgroup members may have so‐called “sedative” 
effects, decreasing perceived injustice and collective action motiva‐
tion; while being friends with outgroup members may have what one 
may call “awareness‐raising” effects, increasing perceived injustice 
and collective action motivation.
Importantly, on the basis of their review the authors propose 
that for intergroup contact to foster collective action among the 
disadvantaged and the advantaged, a certain contact threshold is 
required (with which they mean: potential intergroup friendships), 
as well as consensus about group differences and inequalities. The 
authors thus argue that intergroup friendships can be called upon to 
mobilize individuals for collective action, but only when all involved 
already agree about the need for social change. This suggests that 
we need harmony (e.g., contact) in order to mobilize for conflict (e.g., 
collective action). In fact, this may be why intergroup frienships are 
so important—individuals will be structurally invested in friendships 
more than more superficial forms of contact, and thus need to regu‐
late this relationship more.
Second, the article by Carter and colleagues entitled The racial 
composition of students’ friendship networks predicts perceptions of 
injustice and involvement in collective action asks whether positive 
and frequent intergroup contact, once again in terms of intergroup 
friendships (specifically between college students from disadvan‐
taged or advantaged groups) predicts individuals’ motivation to en‐
gage in collective action. As such, this article can be interpreted in 
the context of the threshold argument as articulated by MacInnis 
and Hodson. Carter et al.’s findings showed that for disadvantaged 
group members, intergroup contact had sedative effects, whereas 
for advantaged group members, it had awareness‐raising effects. 
The authors thus conclude that (p. 57): “students’ involvement in 
collective action on campus is influenced, at least in part, by their 
perceptions of the injustice that marginalized students experience 
on campus, and the racial composition of students’ friendship net‐
works predict these perceptions of injustice.”
This is interesting in at least two ways. First, it supports the idea 
that individuals’ need for relationship regulation—in terms of inter‐
group friendship—may be part of the underlying psychology of both 
sedative and awareness‐raising processes. Furthermore, it explicitly 
links this to social networks, which provide structural opportunities 
to form and maintain such friendships. Second, it is also interesting 
to observe what is not explicitly mentioned—for example, the article 
does not report or discuss other aspects of psychology related to 
collective action, such as individuals’ group identification and their 
group efficacy beliefs—yet these are core motivations for collective 
action (Van Zomeren et al., 2008), and arguably the more unifying 
and empowering aspects of engaging in collective action (Drury & 
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Reicher, 2009). As such, the Carter et al. article does not speak to 
whether intergroup contact can unify and empower individuals to‐
ward fighting for social change.
The latter is important because, third, Thomas and colleagues offer 
an answer to this question in their contribution, entitled Transnational 
contact and challenging global poverty: Intergroup contact intensifies 
(the right kind of) social identities to promote solidarity‐based collec‐
tive action for those low in social dominance. In their study, they offer 
a longitudinal test of the idea that (transnational) contact promotes 
(solidarity‐based) collective action because it intensifies supportive 
(opinion‐based) social identities among advantaged group members. 
These authors draw on the notion of (opinion‐based) group identities, 
which basically entail MacInnis and Hodson’s second criterion—that 
of consensus about a need for collective action. Indeed, Hoskin et al.’s 
notion of opinion‐based group identity is based on opinions about 
how the world should be, and by identifying with such a psychological 
group, all involved effectively share the same opinion.
Contact, in their view, “intensifies” that shared reality and thus 
motivation for collective action. They find support for these ideas 
in their study, although only for individuals who score low on Social 
Dominance Orientation, which I interpret as meaning that they would 
be very likely to score high on valuing social change toward inter‐
group equality. Hoskin et al. interpret their findings as suggesting 
that “coming into contact with ostensible outgroup members may 
allow group members to develop an awareness that what ‘is’ is not 
what ‘should be’ and therefore provides an impetus for the intensi‐
fication of social identities based on opinions about how the world 
should be” (p. 29).
This line of thought seems to imply different types of “we” in the 
underlying psychology of intergroup contact and collective action. 
One implies intergroup friendships within which “we” think alike (for 
instance about the need for social change), whereas the other im‐
plies psychological group membership within which “we” think alike 
(for instance through identification with an opinion‐based group). 
Yet it remains unclear, from the contributions in this Special Issue 
at least, how these two types of “we” should be conceptualized and 
understood in conjunction.
Clearly, Hoskin et al. have little faith in the first type of “we,” 
claiming that: “If the effects of positive intergroup contact are to en‐
dure beyond the lab to promote collective action among advantaged 
group members then we need to go beyond inter‐personal friend‐
ships and consider alternative forms of affiliation and connection 
with others based on shared identity” (p. 24). Likewise, both MacInnis 
& Hodson and Carter et al. did not include group identification in 
their analysis (yet focused on perceived injustice), despite meta‐ana‐
lytic evidence that if one wants to predict collective action, it would 
be wise to include measures of multiple motivations for collective 
action (i.e., group identification, anger, and efficacy beliefs; Van 
Zomeren et al., 2008). These gaps points to a barrier toward theoreti‐
cal integration that needs to be remove, if we want to understand the 
underlying psychology of intergroup contact and collective action, 
with an eye to social change. Indeed, to this end I believe we need to 
start taking each type of “we” seriously to the same degree.
The tendency toward category‐based forms of “we” is continued 
in the fourth contribution by Römpke et al., entitled Get together, feel 
together, act together: International personal contact increases identifi‐
cation with humanity and global collective action. The authors propose 
that although intergroup contact may have sedative effects in inter‐
group conflicts, such contact may actually be ideal for bringing peo‐
ple together from different groups to act collectively against global 
crises (e.g., climate change). They predict and find across a number 
of studies that individuals engaging in international contact identify 
more strongly with “all of humanity” and are more willing to engage 
in relevant forms of action.
As such, intergroup contact and collective action once more 
seem joined at the hip, in this case through the notion of transna‐
tional contact and identification with all humanity. At the same time, 
it is important to note that global crises are fundamentally different 
from the contexts within which Wright and Lubensky (2009) identi‐
fied the strategic imcompatibility between intergroup contact and 
collective action. In fact, it is difficult to see the same tension be‐
tween harmony and conflict when focusing on a collective problem 
relevant to everyone involved. Moreover, one can wonder about the 
meaning and sustainability of group identities that comprise all “hu‐
manity.” In the absence of a clear outgroup, one might expect that in‐
dividuals need to feel distinct within such an abstract, encompassing 
psychological group. Once more, then, the underlying psychology 
here requires a view on different types of “we.”
Finally, Zagefka’s paper is entitled Triadic intergroup relations: 
Studying situations with an observer, an actor, and a recipient of be‐
haviour. Her key theoretical observation is that intergroup contact 
and collective action researchers typically conceive of social in‐
equality in dichotomous ways, for instance, reducing such a con‐
text to members of disadvantaged and advantaged groups. Zagefka 
argues convincingly that unlocking a triadic perspective, although 
modestly increasing the number of collective actors from just two 
to just three, already offers more scope for understanding contact, 
collective action, and social change.
I agree whole‐heartedly with this suggestion, not in the least be‐
cause this raises rather fundamental questions about what type(s) 
of “we” can be expected in contexts that move beyond dichotomous 
intergroup relations. Although some may argue that such contexts 
evoke an even stronger psychological need for individuals to cate‐
gorize	 the	world	 in	 ingroup‐outgroup	dichotomoties	 (e.g,.	 Subašić,	
Reynolds, & Turner, 2008), the emphasis in the other contributions 
on intergroup friendships may suggest that more complex contexts 
evoke a need to regulate relationships within the social networks we 
are part of. To this end, in the next section I will describe a recent line 
of research (Klavina & Van Zomeren, 2018) that shows how inter‐
group contact facilitates collective action in such a triadic context.
3  | A REL ATIONAL PERSPEC TIVE
In this section, I apply a relational perspective on what moves and 
motivates individuals in their lives to the underlying psychology of 
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intergroup contact and collective action. In doing so, I conceptualize 
both intergroup contact and collective action as different forms of 
relationship regulation, and thus of regulating potentially different 
types of “we” (be it friendships or psychological group memberships). 
Whereas the rationale for conceptualizing collective action as rela‐
tional interaction can be found in detail elsewhere (Van Zomeren, 
2014, 2015, 2016), the case for intergroup contact seems even more 
clear‐cut, especially given the operationalization of such contact as 
intergroup friendship (Carter et al., 2019 MacInnis & Hodson, 2019). 
The simple observation in either case is that both phenomena occur 
within (networks) of social relationships, and would be hard to imag‐
ine outside of them.
Social psychology is rife with pointers toward the pivotal im‐
portance of social relationships, social interaction, and embed‐
dedness in social networks for individuals’ health and happiness. 
Indeed, humans are an ultra‐social species with a strong need 
to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Individuals can empathize 
with others in need (Batson, 1990), suffer psychologically and 
physically from loneliness (Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008), and dis‐
play attachment behavior regulate relationships long before our 
self‐concept arises (Ainsworth, 1979, 1989; Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 
1980; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a, 2007b). Social interaction and 
the development of relational ties provide us with “safe havens” (to 
seek shelter in; e.g., Van Zomeren et al., 2016) or “secure bases” 
(on which to explore the world), which need to be maintained and 
regulated (Fiske, 1992).
This also implies that individuals need to continuously cope with 
what they dread most: Social exclusion and social loss (Bowlby, 1969, 
1973, 1980; Williams, 2007; see also Eisenberger, 2012; Eisenberger, 
Lieberman & Williams, 2003; MacDonald & Leary, 2005). This is 
not without good reason: A meta‐analysis suggested that a lack of 
social relationships increases mortality risk (Holt‐Lunstad, Smith & 
Layton, 2010), while social loss increases the risk of severe depres‐
sion (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980; Stroebe & Stroebe, 1987; Stroebe, 
Schut & Stroebe, 2005). Furthermore, networks of relationships 
provide individuals with instrumental and emotional support that 
facilitate coping with stress (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Stroebe, Stroebe, 
Abakoumkin, & Schut, 1996) and buffer them from the effects of 
negative life events (Berkman, Glass, Seeman, & Brisette, 2000; 
Heaney & Israel, 2008). Interestingly, research on psychological 
group membership has basically come to the same conclusion in re‐
cent years (Jetten, Haslam, Haslam & Branscombe, 2009), namely 
that social connection makes us healthier.
A relational perspective offers a number of additional insights. 
First, embeddedness in social relationships imply restrictions to in‐
dividuals’ degrees of freedom. In this view, individuals are assumed 
to prioritize maintaining relationships over terminating them, which 
means that social relationships require continuous and effortful 
regulation. For instance, expecting others to be available and re‐
sponsive to your needs also implies that others expect you to be 
available and responsive to their needs—an obligation that is called 
upon when, for example, a friend asks you to come to a demonstra‐
tion next week.
A second addition is that relationship regulation implies forces of 
harmony as well as conflict—in this view, these are different sides of 
the same relational coin. For instance, if maintaining harmony within 
the group (e.g., one’s family) is more important to a Black individual 
than risking conflict with Whites in one’s neighborhood, then there 
is no necessary tension between engaging in collective action to‐
gether against racial discrimination. Fiske and Rai (2015) even went 
as far as to suggest that our embeddedness in social relationships 
is so fundamental that it also explains why people turn violent. For 
instance, honor killings are, in this view, not acts of mad men, but 
of individuals trying to regulate their relationships within the group 
(e.g., defending the family reputation) through such violence against 
others (that threaten the family reputation).
Taken together, a relational perspective offers an underlying psy‐
chology of intergroup contact and collective action that may help 
to explain why their match can be one made in hell, or in heaven. 
This perspective acknowledges that there is one type of “we,” for 
example derived from intergroup friendship, that is fundamentally 
different from another type of “we” that is derived from psycholog‐
ical group membership. Individuals’ regulation of the first type of 
“we” needs to fit with their regulation of the second type of “we,” 
if we want intergroup contact and collective action to be a match 
made in heaven (such as when participation in collective action is 
predicted by being asked by a friend). This fits with MacInnis and 
Hodson’ notion of a contact threshold and with Hoskin et al.’s notion 
of opinion‐based groups, but a relational perspective considers both 
types of “we” within the same analysis, and bases them in the under‐
lying psychology of relationship regulation, thus offering a broader 
and integrative view on intergroup contact and collective action.
4  | EMPIRIC AL ILLUSTR ATIONS OF A 
REL ATIONAL PERSPEC TIVE
In this section, I illustrate a relational perspective with relevant 
empirical findings. For instance, individuals’ participation in collec‐
tive action depends crucially on the social networks in which they 
are embedded (Schussman & Soule, 2005; see also Klandermans, 
Van der Toorn, & Van Stekelenburg, 2008). Their embeddedness in 
specific activist networks, for example, offers them structural op‐
portunities to participate in collective action, as one’s friends may 
frequently ask one to join an action (and one may ask others in the 
network in turn). This is a clear example of relationship regulation 
in (collective) action, suggesting that individuals’ hearts and minds 
are certainly important, but that our hearts and minds are intimately 
connected to those of others around us. Furthermore, the relation‐
ships in our networks provide us with a safe haven to seek shelter 
in, or as a secure base to explore (and potentially change) the world 
around us.
Activist networks, however, are rather rare, as most people are 
not embedded in such networks. So what happens in non‐activist 
networks? Van Zomeren et al. (2016) surveyed Indonesian ethnic 
minority members in two studies, linking individuals’ seeking shelter 
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in their social relationships (i.e., turning to friends and significant oth‐
ers in times of trouble) and their ethnic group identification to well‐
being and collective action against ethnic discrimination. Results 
across the two studies showed that despite perceiving their group 
to be discriminated in society, individuals’ shelter‐seeking positively 
predicted their well‐being above and beyond their ethnic group 
identification; furthermore, neither of those variables predicted 
their collective action tendencies. Thus, whereas activist networks 
may be great mobilizers because of individuals’ need for relation‐
ship regulation, non‐activist networks may be great harmonizers 
for the very same reason. Importantly, in either case ethnic group 
identification did not explain unique variance in these psychological 
processes.
Furthermore, Górska, van Zomeren, and Bilewicz (2017) ex‐
amined whether nation‐level institutionalization of minority rights 
(in this case lesbian, gay, and bisexual, or LGB, rights) may influ‐
ence more positive attitudes toward this group. This is relevant 
because such institutionalized progressive change is precisely the 
type of social change people engaging in collective action may 
be after. In this sense, Gorska et al. (2017) asked whether such 
top‐down changes in the social structure, once they occurred as 
presumably enforced in conflictuous ways through collective ac‐
tion, affected individuals’ prejudice toward this group. Using rep‐
resentative Eurobarometer data from 28 European Union Member 
States, Gorska et al. found that such progressive changes in laws 
and institutions indeed reduced prejudice toward LGB groups; fur‐
thermore, this appeared to be due to increasing possibilities for 
intergroup contact with LGB individuals. Thus, we see here the 
importance of how the hearts and minds of individuals may change 
as a function of increased opportunities for intergroup contact—
not unlike collective action participation is increased by increased 
structural opportunities to participate (Schussman & Soule, 2005). 
The underlying psychology here, I would argue, is one in which 
(changes in) social structure affords individuals’ relationship regu‐
lation, with prejudice reduction and collective action as potential 
downstream consequences.
Finally, let me describe a set of three studies we conducted 
(Klavina & Van Zomeren, 2018) on the underlying psychology 
of intergroup contact and collective action. In this line of work, 
Zagefka (2019) would be overjoyed to see that we focused on tri‐
adic contexts in which intergroup contact and collective action 
were both psychologically and contextually relevant. We exam‐
ined whether the same core motivations for collective action that 
we typically find to apply to disadvantaged and advantaged group 
members (i.e., group identification, anger, and efficacy beliefs; Van 
Zomeren et al., 2008) also apply to “third groups” —groups outside 
of an unequal intergroup relationship (e.g., Blacks and Whites) that 
nevertheless could be psychologically or actually affected (e.g., 
Latinos in terms of police brutality in the US). The research ques‐
tion we asked across three studies with different triadic contexts 
was whether third group members would be motivated for collec‐
tive action to protect their own ingroup from future disadvantage, 
or to protect the disadvantaged outgroup from actual disadvantage. 
Furthermore, we explored how intergroup contact (with the dis‐
advantaged outgroup) would affect individuals’ motivation for col‐
lective action on behalf of that group.
The third and final study of this set was conducted in the US, 
with Latino participants eying the intergroup relationship beween 
Whites and Blacks. But the other two studies had perhaps lesser‐
known contexts that require somewhat more explanation. Study 1 
was conducted in Latvia, after the Russian annexation of the Crimea 
(formerly in the Ukrain). We thus asked Latvians about their moti‐
vations for collective action in order to protect themselves, or to 
protect the Ukrainians. Similarly, in Study 2 we used a Dutch con‐
text within which a government‐associated gas extraction company 
came under scrutiny after the emergence of earthquakes in the 
populated gas extraction area in the North of the Netherlands. We 
surveyed those close to, yet still outside of, the affected areas about 
their willingness to engage in collective action to protect their own 
region from becoming part of those areas in the future, or to protect 
those in the affected areas.
Across the three studies, and consistent with previous work, we 
found that individuals’ willingness to engage in collective action to 
protect their ingroup was predicted by their ingroup (rather than out‐
group) identification, anger, and efficacy beliefs. Thus, Latinos were 
more likely to act to protect Latinos against police brutality in the 
US, when they identified more strongly with their ingroup (measured 
with often‐used items such as “I identify with Latinos”). Furthermore, 
we found that individuals’ willingess for collective action to protect 
the disadvantaged outgroup was predicted by their outgroup (rather 
than ingroup identification, anger and efficacy beliefs. Thus, Latinos 
were more likely to act to protect Blacks against police brutality in 
the US, when they identified more strongly with that outgroup (mea‐
sured with the very same often‐used items yet applied to this out‐
group, such as “I identify with Blacks”). The same core motivations 
for collective action thus applied to third group members’ collective 
action intentions.
We then explored the role of intergroup contact, especially 
with an eye to the notion of “outgroup identification” (which, in 
the theoretical universe of social identity and self‐categorization 
theory, cannot and hence does not exist, as identification with a 
group implies this group psychologically being or becoming an in‐
group). Across the studies, we consistently found that intergroup 
contact (measured as frequent and positive contact with outgroup 
members) with the disadvantaged outgroup positively predicted 
identification with this outgroup, which in turn positively pre‐
dicted collective action intentions. Furthermore, across the stud‐
ies we also found that individuals’ so‐called relational models (i.e., 
their endorsement of specific ways of relationship regulation such 
as communal sharing and equality matching; Fiske, 1992) positively 
predicted identification with the disadvantaged outgroup. Taken 
together, this supports the idea that third group members’ inter‐
group contact with disadvantaged outgroup members, and their 
regulation of the specific relational model, positively predicted 
their identification with and collective action on behalf of this 
outgroup.
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5  | LOOKING FORWARD
So far I have looked back on the debate sparked by Wright and 
Lubensky (2009) about the presumed strategic incompatibility be‐
tween intergroup contact and collective action, and observed that 
most of the contributions to this Special Issue come to a somewhat 
different conclusion. I have also offered a theoretical explanation for 
this in terms of an underlying psychology of relationship regulation 
and supplied a number of empirical findings supporting key insights 
from this relational perspective. But what does this imply for the 
future?
There are at least three vistas that follow from the relational 
perspective on intergroup contact and collective action that I have 
suggested. First, I believe it is time to start combining individual and 
structural levels of analysis, with the latter including social networks 
as well as cultural or political systems (e.g., Gorska et al., 2017). This 
implies asking questions about actual and perceived network struc‐
tures and what people do in these networks (in terms of relation‐
ship regulation); about how political and cultural structure affords 
opportunities for contact and collective action; and how all of this 
affects individuals’ motivations for intergroup contact and collec‐
tive action.
Such a multi‐level approach to intergroup contact and col‐
lective action will also be informative for empirically examining 
Wright and Lubensky’s (2009) claim about the two being incom‐
patible strategies toward social change. Indeed, most work on the 
irony of harmony, together with the current contributions raising 
the irony of the irony of harmony, have restricted their line of 
thought and empirical tests to the individual level of analysis—that 
is, the level of individuals’ hearts and minds. But a relational per‐
spective suggests that to understand social change, we need to 
better understand how to change network and/or broader norms 
about how individuals go about regulating which relationships, in‐
cluding both types of “we” encountered in the contributions to this 
Special Issue.
Second, a relationship regulation account does not negate the 
importance of group identification and group membership in the 
psychology of intergroup contact and collective action. Indeed, 
group identification appears to be a key variable in both literatures. 
What this account does assume, however, is that psychological 
groups are formed through regulating relationships within the net‐
works in which individuals are embedded. As a consequence, indi‐
viduals are able to identify with outgroups (without self‐categorizing 
as part of them or as part of a superordinate category), as discussed 
in the studies with the triadic context (Klavina & Van Zomeren, 
2018). What group identity means, in this view, is thus dependent 
on the networks within which people put them to use through rela‐
tionship regulation.
One important implication of this line of thought is that collective 
action can be viewed as a (safe) form of intra‐group contact, which 
develops individuals’ ingroup identity as a secure base on which to ex‐
plore and change the world (Bowlby, 1969; Van Zomeren et al., 2016). 
Similarly, intergroup contact can be viewed as an expansion of one’s 
network with outgroup members—however, incidental forms of in‐
tergroup contact (outside of one’s comfort zone) may differ fom more 
structural forms of intergroup contact that bring a stronger psycho‐
logical investment to the relationship (such as intergroup friendships, 
within one’s comfort zone), and this may precisely be why the latter 
seems more effective in reducing prejudice. Thus, we need a better 
understanding of the different types of “we” toward reaping the pro‐
verbial best of both worlds with an eye to social change.
Third and finally, a relational approach adds considerably to the 
intergroup contact and collective action literature by implying that 
psychological theories about social relationships and relationship 
regulation are missing from these literatures without good reason 
(Mackie & Smith, 1998). In fact, theoretical integration between 
these perspectives may help substantiate the “relations” in “inter‐
group relations,” and force researchers to include, rather than to pre‐
emptively dismiss, measures of different types of “we” in studies of 
intergroup contact and collective action. This may help explain why 
scholars are arguing more and more for structurally positive and fre‐
quent forms of intergroup contact (such as close friendships); and 
why scholars are coming to the conclusion that participation in col‐
lective action is best predicted by the structural availability of others 
(in one’s network) who ask you to be responsive and put your money 
where your mouth is.
One concrete example of this is including the role of attachment 
style, or more precisely, the working models people develop over 
the course of their lifetime that suggest what can be expected from 
others and the self in terms of availability (of/for others) and respon‐
siveness (Bowlby, 1969). Indeed, Reis and Gable (2015) concluded 
that responsiveness is the key predictor of what makes close re‐
lationships harmonious. Hence, a perceived lack of availability and 
responsiveness of the other (or the perceived obligations about 
availability and responsiveness that others may force upon you) is 
what makes them conflictuous. A concrete suggestion for future re‐
search, then, would be that individuals’ attachment styles and work‐
ing models should be strongly predictive of both intergroup contact 
and collective action.
6  | CONCLUSION
I am certainly not the first to suggest that theory and research on 
group processes and intergroup relations can learn something from 
theory and reseach on interpersonal processes, and vice versa (e.g., 
Mackie & Smith, 1998). I am also certainly not the first to suggest 
that social networks and social structure matter in intergroup con‐
tact and collective action (e.g., Gorska et al., 2017; Klandermans et 
al., 2008), and that we need a more diverse theoretical and meth‐
odological repertoire in order to better understand whether, for 
example, intergroup contact and collective action work against, or 
together with, each other (Pettigrew, 1998).
I am probably the first, however, to be in a position to discuss 
the interesting contributions to this Special Issue, and from that 
position I have expressed pretty much all the above things. The 
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key message here is that Wright and Lubensky’s (2009) argument 
about intergroup contact and collective action as a match made 
in hell does not seem to do justice to their underlying psychology 
in terms of relationship regulation, which can also lead to their 
match as one being made in heaven. Indeed, those who engage in 
collective action and intergroup contact are ultimately engaged in 
regulating relationships with other people around them. Perhaps, 
then, the current Special Issue signals that the time has arrived to 
start treating them as such.
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